We will now reexamine the Vives (1985) results in a homogeneous product market. Consider a n firm oligopoly satisfying the following assumptions o (P , P ) .. 0 i f P ;> P for some j.
The above means that if i's price is below j's price it gets the whole market whereas if theY,charge the same price they share the market equally.
(d) We assume that in price competition a firm always supplies the demand it faces.
Define the following:
where 2 s m s n
We know from Dastidar (Forthcoming) that Pi and Pi exist and they -are unique. Also P < P . Also define the following,
Price competition
Suppose that both firms employ price as their strategic variable.
NovI from De! t: 1. ci,,, i the following two conditions hold simultaneously 11' (P) c: 7r (P) > 7r (1' -E) V € > 0, and 11' (1') ;;: -C ( 0 )
Since the above two conditions hold for P also our claim follows.
Quantity Competition
If both firms employ quantity as its strategic variables then we have the Cournot equilibrium.
p.
(f) We aS,sume that QH" (Q) + H' (Q) sO. where H (Q) and Q = ~ Q,
The above guarantees the existence of Cournot equilibrium (see Novshek (1985) and Shapiro, (1989». 
If all firms have symmetric costs C, (.) which are strictly convex .1.
then the Bertrand equilibrium is necessarily non-unique. In fact * any P E [P (n), P (n)] is a Bertrand equilibrium.
Now consider the Bertrand equilibrium price of P i (n). We know from Dastidar (forthcoming) that,
).
(P. (n), n)
.1.
., ~ C (0) '" " and 7f,
(P I n) :so; -C (0) t V P s P, (n) 
Again the first order conditions for Cournot equilibrium are as follows :
]. i
We claim that QC > 0 =:
Suppose on the contrary that 11' C s -C(O) 'From the analysis in Dastidar (forthcoming) it is evident that the Bertrand equilibrium is unique and is given by pe = pm = 20/3. Comparing Cournot and Bertrand-in a Homogeneous Product Market· (Sept~ 1994) 
